9. Ninth Lecture: Disposition of Human Nature and Free Will
In this lecture, we will explore Schelling’s rich and intriguing understanding of free will, especially in comparison to Kant. This discussion provides a broader and more nuanced insight into the disposition and development of the fundamental properties of human character, particularly for those familiar with Kant’s lectures (Introduction to Kant). Both acknowledge a predisposition toward good or evil. However, Schelling offers a compelling explanation of how the soul differs from consciousness, asserting that fundamental and profound choices are made by the soul before the individual, as a physical and conscious being, gains awareness. This primordial disposition directs the individual toward a certain path, with their free will ultimately aligning with this inherent inclination. Unlike Kant’s moral philosophy, which posits that practical reason and morality can transcend such predispositions, Schelling argues that no such rational or moral capacity can override this foundational orientation. In conclusion, Schelling firmly upholds the reality of free will, arguing that it is the soul's capacity to mediate between necessity and freedom, thus enabling the individual to actively participate in their moral and existential development despite their primordial inclinations.
To understand the roots of Schelling’s perspective on the subject’s personality, we must explore a concept that may seem deterministic from a psychological point of view — the development of human character and individual psyche before self-consciousness.
When it comes to Schelling, there is a clear distinction between spirit and consciousness. We have emphasized the importance of this separation concerning psychology, the dynamic unconscious, and the formation of the “ego.” However, one related aspect might initially seem odd: Schelling was convinced that a person's essential characteristics, particularly their inclination toward good or evil, are determined before the inception of self-consciousness (resulting in the creation of "Personality" through the third potential, A³). In essence, this means that a person's fundamental character — whether good or evil — is determined either before birth or at the moment of birth.
Schelling states: "Each individual, if he is aware of himself, must admit that he is by no means arbitrarily or by accident good or evil; an evil individual, for example, surely appears to himself not in the least compelled /.../ but rather performs his actions in accordance with and not against his will," referring to the "unconscious decision" one has made before becoming self-conscious.
Comparison to Kant
Since Kant had already developed the origin of a similar idea, we shall briefly turn to Kant to explore how he articulated the formation of a good or evil character before it could be comprehended through reason.
Schelling also believed in an unconscious choice. In a heavily cited passage, he states: "Judas /.../ betrayed Christ not under compulsion but willingly and with complete freedom. It is exactly the same with a good individual; namely, he is not good arbitrarily or by accident and yet is so little compelled that, rather, no compulsion, not even the gates of hell themselves, would be capable of overpowering his basic disposition ['Gesinnung']. This sort of free act, which becomes necessary, admittedly cannot appear in consciousness to the degree that the latter is merely self-awareness and only ideal, since it precedes consciousness."
As a proponent of free will, I believe the following (although many thinkers I have debated have tried to prove me wrong). Schelling’s statement suggests that Judas’s betrayal of Christ was rooted in a primordial disposition inherent in his identity, formed through an unconscious and pre-conscious act of freedom. This predisposition did not compel Judas to betray Christ but shaped the direction of his inner will, making the betrayal a self-evident course of action. For Judas, overcoming this primordial orientation with internal freedom would have been categorically more difficult than for individuals whose dispositions aligned with goodness, such as other disciples. However, Schelling’s philosophy does not negate the possibility of such a struggle; Judas, through practical reason and the conscious formation of his will, could have redirected his freedom to resist his predisposition, though this would have required an extraordinary exertion of will against the depth of his foundational orientation.
When discussing this primordial realm of choices, however, we must recognize — based on what we have explored regarding the "indivisible remainder" — that this "primordial absolute" is essentially unconscious, influencing the mechanics of decision-making continuously (not merely something that occurred long ago). This is the "S₀" in the model of Evolutionary Truth.
Schelling makes a distinction between temporal life and creation through the absolute: "Man, even if born in time, is indeed created into the beginning of creation (the centrum).”
This way of defining a subject's character also becomes important when understanding the distinctions between Schelling and Kant, as opposed to Fichte.
In simplest terms, Schelling acknowledged that human character (whether one is good or evil) is determined primordially, before the advent of consciousness. Similarly, Kant developed the idea of a disposition toward good or evil.
