8. Eight Lecture: Lacan, Žižek, the Real, and “B”

This lecture is not one of the easiest and goes well beyond merely praising the "much-needed craziness" in the formula, despite frequent references to Žižek and Lacan. What we uncover here is something far more profound—an idea that I later expanded upon in my lectures on "Religion." Specifically, for an aim or purpose to exist, there must be something that defines its boundaries—a form of madness or chaos that shapes the "edge," the beginning of structured order emerging from disorder. Essentially, no system can function without a glitch or exception that works against it; likewise, there can be no central values without the margins that define and challenge them.


Lacan referred to the idea that, as he stated, "there is one [y'a de l'Un]," a consistent, rational structure has to be anchored to an "irrational" exception of the One, which, in its very capacity as an exception, guarantees the consistency of the overall structure. As Žižek says in his The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters: "Reason's condition of possibility is the condition of its impossibility."

Similarly, logician Kurt Gödel refers to the idea that any formal logic system contains certain basic assumptions or axioms that cannot be proven within the system. For example, the belief in the existence of an external world (taken as given by most) cannot be proven or deduced within our subjective experience of the world (using formal systems of reasoning).

When it comes to the human psyche, the only way to maintain sanity in the world is to possess a capacity for such “madness.” We can see that the "Weltformel" and Lacan's idea of the split subject function in the same way.

Let us explore this based on the "Weltformel." We must understand that there is the abyss of ultimate freedom as an abyss of absolute indifference that precedes A and B. When we move from absolute freedom toward the "Ideal," this move can only happen through the "madness" of the "Real."

There is always the irreducible gap (B) between pure freedom and every determinate symbolic representation of the subject in (A) as the ideal medium. When we want to leap from "pure freedom" to "A," we must go through "B."

Thus, the following statement from Žižek makes perfect sense: "The ever-increasing sublation ["Aufhebung"] of the Real (B) in the Ideal (A), the progressive subordination of the Real to the Ideal, relies on the exception of a B which, as the excluded ground of the process of sublation, guarantees its consistency."

In exact terms, "Wahn-Sinn" ("madness, delirious sense") is the ground from which "Sinn" ("divine sense, blissful true spiritual freedom") perpetually draws its life force. Thus, there is a movement from Un-Sinn ("the senseless fact of physical existence") toward Sinn ("divine sense") through "Wahn-Sinn" ("madness").

Žižek describes the mechanics of this: "Sinn appears to man only in a flash, in the guise of a traumatic encounter whose sudden dazzle throws him off the rails: man is anchored to his egotistic ground to such an extent that he cannot endure the direct sight of the light of Sinn, but can only imitate Sense, under the constant threat of slipping back into the rotary motion of Ground."

Per “Weltformel,” only a small part of the potential “unreason” becomes “sensible” (which explains the relationship between human beings and the rest of the world). Schelling states in his Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie: “What we call the world, /…/ cannot possibly be the impression of something which has arisen by the necessity of reason /…/ it contains a preponderant mass of unreason.” (Also, stressing the important distinction between being and consciousness.)

However, there is one more aspect Žižek wishes to hammer home. We should not merely conclude that "Reason is regulated madness," because the very act of how reason appears (from senselessness) is a contingent "crazy gesture," unexpected and mad in itself. Žižek puts it well: "It is not sufficient to assert that Reason discerns the islands of Necessity in the sea of Chaos — the very gesture of instituting Necessity is radically contingent."

Comparing this to Lacan's approach, we can see a matching concept. There is no symbolic representation without fantasy. When it comes to the symbolic order, the split subject ($) is constitutively split between "S1" and "a." It can represent itself in "S1," a signifier, only insofar as a reference to "objet petit a” (as the "object-cause" of desire, the desire for the desire itself, a stand-in for the unattainable Real) guarantees the fictional consistency of the signifying network (Žižek's description).

This means that the "objet petit a" is a point of reference that allows the subject to construct a stable and consistent identity for functioning in the world. We think we are rational subjects in a framework we have created, not realizing that it is always based on a fundamental lack and is inherently unstable and illusory. Thus, the subject's rationality is always based on "madness" or illusion.

"The leap from $ (pure Freedom) to A (the ideal medium) is possible only via a detour through B in the medium of B; in other words, it is radically contingent: if the split subject ($) is to represent-express itself in A, it has to rely on B, on a contracted element which eludes idealization. /…/ Schelling's point is not that A is ultimately bound to serve B; instead, it resides in the irreducible gap between pure Freedom ($) and every symbolic scheme of Reason, every determinate symbolic representation of the subject in A, in the ideal medium.”

Žižek means that B is a contingent and disruptive element that cannot be fully represented in the symbolic order. Disrupting and shaping the ideal medium (A) is necessary to make symbolic representation and expression possible. B is crucial in preventing the idealization of the symbolic order and in allowing for the possibility of contingency and disruption, which are essential elements of the human experience.

If the symbolic order were fully idealized, the individual would submerge into the big Other. Schelling refers to a similar concept concerning God: "If it (B) were God, then the entire unity would act as the now completely realized God.”

Here we can see an important and exciting aspect of human subjectivity that Žižek also points out repeatedly, referring to the “craziness” of the whole process through which the “Sinn” emerges from “Un-Sinn” (through the vital help of “Wahn-Sinn”). Namely, in its essence, the subject is “hysterical in nature.”

This means we, as subjects, only “imitate” morality and maintain a logical symbolic order. Subjectivity can exist, and one can function as a subject, only because one (as a subject) cannot know what it wants (or, more precisely, what the big Other wants from it). The moment the subject comes to know it, the subject’s status changes from the subject to the object (of the desire of the Other). Thus, “de-hystericization” would mean the collapse of the subject's identity (leading to “subjective destitution,” that is, the subject acting out its drives by becoming an object of the drive—a phenomenon we shall discuss later).

Žižek refers to Lacan, stating:

“When Lacan asserts that 'the question of the Other, which comes back to the subject from the place from which he expects an oracular reply in some such form as Che vuoi?, "What do you want?", is the one that best leads him to the path of his own desire,' he aims at something even more fundamental: the enigma of the Other's desire in its impenetrability, insofar as it eludes symbolization — in short, the Other's desire confronts me with the opacity of the impossible Real that resists symbolization.”

In The Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek refers to the true meaning of the answer to this question of the big Other ("What do you want?”) even more clearly as “the unbearable enigma of the desire of the Other, of the lack in the Other, but it is at the same time fantasy itself which, so to speak, provides the coordinates of our desire – which constructs the frame enabling us to desire something.” He also states: "Briefly: 'Why am I what you [the big Other] are saying that I am?' Confrontation with the opaque desire of the Other is how the subject maintains its identity." Žižek further adds:

“When I know that the Other wants something from me, without knowing what this desire is, I am thrown back into myself, compelled to assume the risk of freely determining the coordinates of my desire.”

Essentially, we can conclude that the Real (and thus the vital “madness”) is not only that which resists symbolization but also the very disturbance of the symbolic order that makes the whole symbolic representation (that forms the identity of the subject) possible.

We can also see a matching approach regarding unconscious subjectivity in the context of Evolutionary truth. As part of the deep unconscious, B shows that subjectivity is constitutively dissociated, similar to how “S0” drives our reactions and governs our choices and actions. In this sense, in the "Weltformel," the bracketed-out B can be seen as the symbol for the unconscious primordial subjectivity (“S0”) in the model of Evolutionary truth.

In the simplest terms, “B,” as part of the "Real" in the “Weltformel,” functions as the indivisible remainder (according to Žižek). It is the necessary source of irrationality that keeps a system functional — a source of “madness” that enables us to make sense of ourselves and the world.