14. Fourteenth Lecture: Little Dictionary of Some Kantian Terms
This is another one of the preliminary lectures, where we draw some key conclusions about Kant and the terms he uses, primarily in the Critique but also in other works. I have found that this lecture is actually very important because it is nearly impossible to understand Kant if one confuses the fundamental terms. It is also easy to confuse them, as many are counterintuitive.
Understanding Kant becomes a lot easier when we understand what he meant by some of his terms. Here are just a few that one should know.
Sensations (Empfindungen) are the raw sensory inputs we receive from the external world, such as smell, taste, and visual images. For example, when there is an armchair in the room, depending on one's sensory faculties, one can see, touch, taste, smell, or hear it. Kant states that, insofar as we are affected by an object, the sensation is “the effect of an object on the capacity for representation.”
However, all sensations must always occur in a manifold (Mannigfaltigkeit) for our mind to process them into appearances. For example, we distinguish sound against lesser noise or color against contrasting colors. Sensations also require at least the intuition of time to be minimally comprehensible.
Appearances (Erscheinungen) are the result of our mind processing sensations through the a priori forms of intuition (space and time). Appearances, also known as phenomena, represent our subjective experience of the noumenal (things-in-themselves) external world. For instance, when exploring an armchair, we perceive its design, texture, and other qualities. Kant refers to appearances as "the undetermined object of an empirical intuition.”
Kant elaborates: “It is only the form of sensuous intuition by which we can intuit things a priori, but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us.” Thus, for an appearance to manifest, there may be a direct sensation as intuition, or we may use our imagination to combine existing concepts (which may originally stem from sensory inputs). In both cases, we employ pure intuition (time and space) and pure concepts (categories of understanding) to create appearances.
Matter and form (Materie, Form) are properties of appearances. Form refers to the a priori structure of an appearance, while matter represents the actual content in the appearance that we sense (a posteriori). For example, when observing a leather armchair, the matter includes the colors and textures we perceive, while the form involves the spatial arrangement and shape.
Perception (Wahrnehmung) involves the mind's organization and interpretation of appearances. Through perception, we create experiences from our sensations that have meaning for us.
Representations (Vorstellungen) are the mental content or images resulting from the mind's processing of appearances through perception. Representations can include intuitions, concepts, and judgments. While all perceptions are a type of representation, representations encompass both empirical and intellectual content.
For example, encountering a leather armchair in the real world might generate a perception that includes empirical concepts and pure categories of understanding, such as its color, texture, and design. This perception is an empirical representation. However, if I think of the concept of a chair in my mind (without encountering it physically), creating a spatiotemporal mental picture of it, it is also a representation—albeit an intellectual one.
Let us now explore distinctions between perceptions (representations), experience (Erfahrung), and judgments(Urteilskraft).
Experience is more than mere perception; it synthesizes perceptions, concepts, and judgments. It forms the basis for empirical knowledge, which is personal and subjective but can have a universal aspect because it is structured by the a priori forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories of understanding. Kant stated, “Experience itself is nothing other than a continual conjoining (synthesis) of perceptions” and “Experience is an empirical cognition, i.e., a cognition that determines an object through perceptions.”
Judgments (Urteilskraft), also known as propositions, are mental acts of connecting or separating concepts. They can be classified according to their source (a priori or a posteriori) and content (analytic or synthetic). Analytic judgments clarify concepts without extending knowledge ("An armchair has armrests"), while synthetic judgments expand our knowledge ("The armchair is made of leather").
For example, suppose I put out a cigarette against an armchair, and it does not leave burn marks.
When I state: "I put out the cigarette against this chair, and I can see no burn marks," it is a judgment of perception, a subjective connection of perceptions in a specific context, lacking objective validity.
When I add the concept of causality: "Putting out a cigarette against an armchair made of genuine leather leaves no burn marks," I am making a judgment of experience. This judgment connects the concepts of "putting out a cigarette" and "leaving no burn marks" according to the category of cause and effect. It has objective validity, as it is based on empirical experience and universally applicable.
Ideas are concepts of reason that do not directly correspond to empirical experience. Instead, they are transcendent concepts produced by our faculty of reason to provide coherence and systematic unity to our knowledge. Ideas are the most general and abstract concepts, serving as regulative principles to guide understanding. However, since they do not directly correspond to empirical experience, they cannot be verified or falsified.
Kant explains: "A concept made up of notions, which goes beyond the possibility of experience, is an idea or a concept of reason."
For example, consider the idea: "When people die, their souls lose the ability to reason." This idea goes beyond empirical experience, as it cannot be confirmed or disproven through sensory input. It also involves transcendent concepts originating in reason (notions).
