7. Seventh Lecture: Relationship Between Two “I”s

After establishing the context, we explore the concept of the "Double I" per Kant in greater depth. This section is also part of my lectures on the introduction to clinical psychology and the explanation of the unconscious. These ideas resonate through the works of Schelling, Fichte, and Lacan, extending to contemporary thinkers such as Žižek. Essentially, this represents a development of the ideas we already touched upon in the second lecture.


What is noteworthy here (in relation to the model of the Evolutionary Truth and primordial subjectivity) is the fact that the “I of pure apperception” can be seen as the “active subject” that posits the I of empirical apperception as its object. Kant defines the I’s of the “Double I”: “1) the ‘‘I’’ as subject of thinking (in logic) [the reflecting I], which means pure apperception,” and “2) the ‘‘I’’ as object of perception [the I of apprehension], therefore of inner sense.”

Here we can see, once again, the principal difference between these I’s. Both belong to the same individual self; however, the “I of pure apperception” is just an idea, an empty form, without any content (thoughts, memories, values), while the “I of empirical apperception” is an inner sense that makes our concrete experiences possible. Kant further stresses that: “the I of inner sense [empirical apperception], that is, of the perception and observation of oneself, is not the subject of judgment, but an object.”

All such introspective analyses are bound to lead one to “an unfathomable depth, to an abyss in the exploration of his nature,” for multiple reasons. Firstly, because the object of such analyses (“I of empirical apperception”) is affected by the subject (“I of pure apperception”) that is doing the analyzing. Kant refers to this, saying: “he has a representation of himself as he is affected by himself, which according to its form depends merely on the subjective property of his nature, which should not be interpreted as belonging to the object.”

Secondly, the situation becomes more complex when we look at the exact process by which objects for subjective understanding are created, according to the transcendental deduction that Kant presents in the Critique of Pure Reason. The sensibility, imagination, and apperception of an “I of empirical apperception” mean that the object of analysis (as “I of empirical apperception”) would actually be composed by itself through the interplay between the mind's a priori faculties (as pure apperception), our ideas, and sensory experience.

That is also why Kant can declare that “if we dare now to speak of objects of inner sense (which as sense always provides appearances only), it is because we are able to reach only cognition of ourselves, not as we are, but as we appear (internally) to ourselves.”

Whatever we do, the best we can achieve is to analyze the appearance (as “he appears to himself, not as he, the observed, is in himself”), not our essence as a thing in itself (“not the inner characteristic of the subject as object [of examination]”).

That may also be why Kant warned against excessive introspection, stating: “in observing ourselves we make a methodical inventory of our perceptions formed in us, which /…/ leads to fanaticism and madness.”

In the simplest terms, our transcendental apperception is forever out of reach of our comprehension—it is our inner equivalent of a thing-in-itself. What makes self-analysis, per Kant, always a little bit schizophrenic is the fact that when we want to understand our empirical self as an object, we must accept that our primordial self-awareness will carry out the analysis as a subject that we can never know in itself; thus all the perceptions we get may also be contingent to an unpredictable extent.

Removal of empirical I and phenomenal existence


Understanding Kant's approach to subjectivity makes understanding other ideas of Kant much easier. It is now obvious that there can be no “double I” in the sense of multiple subjects existing within one person, nor can either of these “I”s be removed (with the person remaining functional). Sometimes the transcendental apperception related to the I (as the pure apperception) is interpreted as if the “I” (as the “I of empirical apperception”) could cause doubt about our phenomenal existence because it “seems” to be there.

In this context, it is incorrect to interpret the word “it seems (scheint)” in relation to our phenomenal existence. The fact that there seems to be an “I” (as the “I of empirical apperception”) related to all our experiences does not mean that “it seems” to exist in the sense that it could or could not be there.

The very fact that we have this idea (of ourselves as “I” in an experience) is already evidence of our existence because, to have this thought, there must be a concept (combined from a manifold of experience) that can only arise from understanding and must be temporal (requiring a form of time). That, in turn, is only possible if the absolute ground of that is the “I of pure apperception.” As Kant puts it: “Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given a priori, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori all my determinate thinking.” Additionally, he explains: “The existence is thereby already given, but the way in which I am to determine it, i.e., the manifold that I am to posit in myself as belonging to it, is not yet thereby given.”

In short, therefore, the fact that we can doubt or question our phenomenal existence is, in a sense, proof of our existence in the phenomenal realm. Thus Kant adds: “‘It seems (scheint) to me that I exist and have this or that representation’’ is a falsification unworthy of any refutation.”

In the simplest terms, it is not possible to argue that one of the “I”s could be removed; otherwise, there would be no functional person left. If one is conscious, one also exists in the phenomenal realm.

Remark regarding Descartes – why mere “thinking” is not enough

From the previous section, one might infer that “thinking” as an activity of “I think” would be sufficient proof of existence, per Kant. This is not the case. Acknowledgment of “thinking” is just a reference to empirical intuition, the content of which is unspecified.

When we analyze the way the human mind works according to Kant, this situation cannot occur without the content of the “thinking” to prove existence. (Here, we also must acknowledge that it is not the case where there was an “empty intuition without an object—ens imaginarium—as an object because this would already qualify as content.”) The problem with Descartes' approach is that “thinking” is a mere form of thought, without substantive matter (“Stoff”) to apply this form to.

Existence can be proven and deduced from empirical intuition when the mind composes an object from perception, requiring the categories of understanding and temporality (time as a form). Kant explains that: “only without any empirical representation, which provides the material for thinking, the act ‘I think’ would not take place.” Thus, he also states: “Hence my existence also cannot be regarded as inferred from the proposition ‘I think,’ as Descartes held.” Kant further adds: “Thinking, taken in itself, is merely the logical function /…/ and in no way does it present the subject of consciousness as appearance.” That is also why Fichte’s first principle was not just “A=A,” but “I=I” (“Ich=Ich”), requiring one to form a thought that contains the thinker.

In the simplest terms, existence cannot simply be inferred from the proposition “I think,” as Descartes held. For Kant, the existence of the thinking subject is grounded in empirical intuition; thus, thinking must always involve some content or representation derived from experience.